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1 Communication and Due Process 
 
Effective and efficient communication constitutes, by definition, the very bedrock of every 
legal process. Unless all the parties to the proceedings – be they prosecutors or defendants, 
plaintiffs or respondents, witnesses, jurors or judges – accurately understand the material put 
before them, and above all the meaning of the all questions asked and the answers given 
during the course of the proceedings in court, the due process of law is will at best be 
seriously impeded, and at worst be thrown seriously off course. If communications blockages 
directly threaten the integrity of the whole legal process, it follows that all those who take 
charge of processes of adjudication – whether as judges, as magistrates or as tribunal 
chairman – should make every possible effort to reduce the impact of such blockages. Equity 
demands no less.  
 
Yet how do such blockages arise? During the course of our daily lives we rarely seem to 
experience much difficulty in communicating with one another.  We all speak the same 
language (or so it is assumed), and we normally seem to comprehend each other – whether at 
home or at work – pretty well.  If something seems unclear or we want more information, all 
we have to do is ask; and if no one asks us to explain, we assume we have indeed been 
understood. 
 
How sound is that assumption? Even at home interpersonal disputes often precipitate 
anguished cries of ‘but you don’t u derstand!’ – most commonly from younger (and so less 
powerful) family members. These sentiments may be more commonplace than we realise. 
Whilst defendants, plaintiffs and witnesses rarely articulate – or get the opportunity to 
articulate – such protests, there can be little doubt that many of them are not only bewildered 
by the arcane ritual of courtroom practice, but also that those who feel at home in that arena 
are wholly unfamiliar with the kind of world in which ‘ordinary people’ like themselves 
inhabit. We all live in differing worlds, whether of age, of gender or of social class; and to the 
extent that that is so, anyone who stumbles unprepared from one such world to another will 
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often find it extremely difficult to make sense of what is going on, let alone to make 
themselves understood. But if that is so even within a population whose members can all be 
broadly identified as ‘English’, such difficulties can only be expected to double and redouble 
in the contexts of ethnic diversity. It is easy to see why. In such situations the linguistic and 
cultural codes which those seeking to communicate with one another habitually employ will 
differ far more radically from one another than deployed by members of different social 
classes (for example) amongst the native English.  
 
Communication is a tricky business. Sometimes one or both parties may be well aware that 
they have not understood, or been understood.  Quite often, however, this is not the case: one 
or the other of the two – or even observers of their transaction – may think they have gained a 
correct understanding of what was intended, when in fact they have not done so. In principle, 
at least, it is possible to check out the adequacy of one’s understanding – or the extent to 
which one has been understood – by asking a supplementary question. But that takes time, 
and time is often short. Moreover when those involved are relatively powerless, the prospect 
of halting the whole proceedings in search of clarification is extremely daunting. Just because 
someone sits mum does not mean that they necessarily understand, or that they feel they have 
been adequately understood. On the contrary they may well feel too fearful, too inadequate, 
or too inarticulate to voice their query in that are a. 
 
By contrast the relatively powerful face a different set of difficulties. Unless one has been 
alerted to the dangers of so doing, most people habitually ‘read’ behaviour in terms of their 
own familiar cultural conventions, and in so doing overlook the possibly that its intended 
meaning may well have been quite different, especially if the behaviour in question was 
generated by someone who habitually operates within a linguistic and cultural context with 
whose rules and conventions the observer is unfamil ar. Ethnocentrism – the use of one’s 
own taken-for-granted cultural assumptions to (mis)interpret other people’s behaviour – is a 
commonplace human failing.  
 
However failures of this kind can have far-reaching consequences, most especially in 
situations of social inequality. In general the rich and powerful tend to be particularly prone 
to ethnocentrism: not only does their very status enable them to impose their own agenda in 
the context of their transactions with everyone less influential than themselves, bu  the 
powerless have by definition only a limited capacity to challenge that agenda, no matter how 
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alien to their own experience it may be. The use of ethnocentric assumptions is therefore a 
ready source of social injustice, since it enables members of one group unthinkingly to 
impose its own expectations and evaluations on another. It is all too easy to fall into such a 
trap, and there can be little doubt that the tendency to do so is widespread. But the 
consequences of doing so can be most unfortunate. Ethnocentric assumptions are a major 
source of the (often unwitting) processes of social exclusion which Sir William Macpherson 
has identified as institutional racism.  
 
2 Culture, cultural plurality and potential social injustice 
 
Ironically enough, language and culture are a Janus-faced phenomena. Although at one level 
a they are a means to successful communication, since information can only be accurately 
transmitted if both parties have access to a shared conceptual code, they have precisely the 
opposite effect in contexts of linguistic and cultural plurality. In those circumstances culture, 
or rather cultural difference becomes barrier to, not a facilitator of, mutual understanding.  
 
How can these difficulties be overcome? At first sight the most s raightf rward answer is to 
suggest that users of non-standard codes should eliminate these difficulties by adopting less 
alien linguistic and cultural conventions as quickly as possible, since a failure to do so will 
necessarily bring social exclusion, and so institutionalised disadvantage, down on the heads. 
Yet however sensible such a solution may seem at first sight, especially from an ethnocentric 
perspective, the minority perspective is often very different. In the first place it rests on the 
assumption that members of minority groups will routinely accept the view that English ways 
comprehensively a superior to their own: members of Britain’s visible minorities are by no 
means alone in rejecting that view, as members of many less visible minorities, uch as the 
Scots, the Welsh and the Jews, for example, would immediately confirm. Secondly and in 
many respects more importantly, the routine acceptance of that view would make access 
justice – and indeed most other public services – a function not so much of citizenship, but of 
acceptance of and conformity to linguistic and cultural conventions of Britain’s dominant 
majority: the native English. Any policy which is predicated on such naively ethnocentric 
assumptions, and which seeks to ignore the existence of ethnic plurality as a de facto reality, 
will necessarily precipitate inequitable outcomes.  
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How, though, can legal practitioners – and indeed the law itself – best respond to the ever 
greater salience of ethnic and cultural plurality? Although there are now an ever growing 
number of people with a sufficient degree of cultural and linguistic competence to be able to 
manoeuvre their way through – and hence both to understand and to be understood in – a 
wide range of differently ordered arenas, comprehensive multi-culturalism in this sense is 
clearly an impossible goal. Contemporary British society already supports far too many 
different such arenas for any one individual to hope to feel equally at home in them all. 
Although familiarising oneself with a second language or culture is undoubtedly a valuable 
experience in its own right, for there is no better way of grasping the artificiality of one’s own 
taken-for-granted assumptions in perspective, it is self-evidently quite impractical to suggest 
that everyone should set about familiarising themselves with everyone else’s codes.  
 
With this in mind it is worth recognising that the primary condition for success in 
overcoming problems in this sphere is not so much the acquisition of an intimate knowledge 
of a wide range of other cultures, but rather through a realisation of just how profoundly 
one’s own personal understandings may be culturally conditioned. Whatever others may do 
or say, it is through the taken for granted spectacles of our own cultural tradition – whatever 
it may be – that each of us initially looks out on, and seeks to make sense of, the world 
around us. Not only this, but we also tend to be strongly attached to our own culture: we have 
grown up within it, and it has made us what we are. Indeed until we actively reflect on what 
is going on, the probability is that we so routinely operate within its precepts that its 
specificity goes unnoticed.  
 
We should therefore never underestimate the influence which our cultural background may 
have on our judgements and perceptions, no matter how open-minded we may consider 
ourselves to be, and that these tendencies very easily flow over from personal to professional 
arenas. Moreover if we lived in a society which was culturally and linguistically 
homogeneous there would be nothing reprehensible about this. So long as the codes which 
are routinely deployed by those making such judgements are congruent with those used by 
the people whose behaviour is being adjudged, all questions about the actual content of the 
codes they use, and as to whether or not their users are aware of doing so, are quite literally 
academic.  
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In a plural society, however, such a position is manifestly unsustainable. In that context it 
follows that unless and until everyone – and every organisation – whose professional role 
includes making sense of, and making judgements about, other people’s behaviour can 
demonstrate that they have taken active steps to counter the impact of ethnocentricity, 
minority complaints that their either have been, or may have been, treated unfairly will 
remain incontestable. Developing the skills, strategies and institutional procedures needed to 
allay such fears must therefore be regarded as an urgent priority. 
 
3 Improving the quality of communication 
3.1 Verbal communication 
The culture of the courts attaches exceptional importance to verbal communication.  The law 
is a written body of rules and procedures, evidence is what witnesses state in court; hence the 
verbal skills of the barrister and judge in questioning witnesses, in analysing their evidence, 
and in transmitting their arguments to the jury are fundamental for successful performance 
their roles. Any failure in verbal communication arising from cross-cultural mi understanding 
in any of these contexts will strike deeply at the effectiveness of the delivery justice in the 
court system. 
 
There are a number of ways in which verbal communication problems may arise in court, the 
most obvious of which is when a witness lacks fluency in the English language.  This clls 
for the use of an interpreter, whose free services all non-English speaking defendants can 
expect to be provided as of right; for equity’s sake, it is probably wise to take the same view 
with respect to non-English speaking witnesses as well. 
 
3.2 When is an interpreter needed? 
An interpreter is needed when effective communication through the medium of the English 
language, at a level adequate for the purposes of the court, cannot be achieved. In most cases, 
the need will be apparent to all concerned, and will h ve been identified in advance of the 
hearing.  In some cases, however, the need for an interpreter may only become apparent in 
court, either because the witness appears to be quite unable to move beyond a series of ‘Yes’ 
and ‘No’ answers, or because the witnesses’ answers are incomprehensible, or because it 
becomes clear that the witness is quite unable to grasp the questions put to him or her. 
Although there is always a possibility that witnesses are using an alleged lack of fluency in 
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English in an effort to evade answering questions, it is nevertheless wise to err in the 
direction of caution in this sphere. Just because someone can ‘get by’ with street-level 
English does not mean that he or she will necessarily have a sufficient command of the 
language to confidently withstand rigorous cross-examination.  
3.3 The role of interpreter 
The role of interpreter is primarily to provide a technically efficient and accurate translation 
of what has been said, and the first qualification required of an interpreter is tha  the p rson 
undertaking the task has the requisite degree of skill and integrity to be able to do so 
effectively. However it is worth remembering that the effective performance of this role in 
court places very wide range of demands on the interpre er.  
 
First of all he (or she) should have the relevant linguistic skills. Although in principle self-
evident, this raises much more complex issues than are apparent at first sight. On the one 
hand the interpreter needs a fluent command of the dialect which the witness actually speaks. 
Most migrants to Britain are of rural origin, and in such contexts dialects often vary 
significantly over distances no greater than a few tens of miles, and in any event each of these 
rural dialects may differ from the standard version of the language spoken by people from 
urban educated  backgrounds. On the other hand it is just as important that the interpreter 
should have a fluent command of English, and especially of any technical vocabulary which 
is relevant to the proceedings in hand. Although the quality of interpreters serving the courts 
is steadily improving, it would nevertheless be idle to suggest that all those currently acting 
as interpreters really fulfil even these minimum requirements.  
 
Nevertheless it should never be forgotten that acting as an interpreter is by its very nature an 
extremely demanding task, so whilst a reasonably competent interpreter can be expected to 
remedy a condition of comprehensive non-communication, reaching the other end of the 
spectrum – such that both the parties concerned gain a comprehensive understanding of what 
the other has said – s a great deal more difficult to achieve. As anyone who speaks two or 
more languages will be aware, translation involves much more than replacing words drawn 
from the lexicon of one language with those drawn from another. Not only does every 
language have its own distinctive grammar, but this is in turn is part of an equally distinctive 
semantic and conceptual framework. If so it follows that even translating simple sentences – 
let alone detailed accounts of what the witness saw or had done – in such a way that they are 
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adequately (let alone accurately) understood by someone wholly unfamiliar with the lexical, 
grammatical, conceptual and cultural code within which those answers were initially framed 
is an immensely complex task. Moreover it is also worth remembering that interpretation is a 
two-way process: the task of translating English questions into the witnesses’ language is just 
as challenging as that of translating the answers back into English again. 
 
It follows that unless interpreters have the opportunity, whenever they deem it necessary, to 
explain to each party the logic of the linguistic and cultural framework within which the other 
is operating, and then to set each question and answer within that context, it is most unlikely 
that the interpreter will be able to facilitate really effective mutual understanding. Translation 
is therefore anything but a mechanical process. Besides having the relevant linguistic 
competence, the ideal translator also needs to be thoroughly familiar with the details of the 
conceptual universe within which each party to the transaction operates, and also skilled in 
rendering questions and answers generated in one into equally meaningful questions and 
answers in the other. Doing this is a tough job, so much so that further clarification will often 
be required if the interpreter is properly to fulfil the task. With this in mind the previous 
edition of this Handbook rightly stressed that “The judge or magistrate should ensure that the 
interpreter …. feels able to bring forward any difficulties or problems should these arise”. But 
although interpreters are widely used, experience suggests that such interventions are so rare 
as to be virtually non-existent. This suggests that the complexity of the task which 
interpreters undertake is not as widely appreciated as it might be.  
 
It goes without saying that none of this should be read as a critique of the use of interpreters: 
litigants with a limited command of English would clearly be much worse off in their 
absence. But is to emphasise that the bare presence of an interpreter cannot be regarded as a 
sufficient solution to the underlying problems of communication – as both i terpreters and 
their clients are very well aware. Members of minority groups are invariably acutely 
conscious of how often members of the majority misunderstand them, and if recent arrivals 
themselves, often just as confused by the curious ways in which members of the ajority 
express and conduct themselves. But although members are usually even more unskilled 
when it comes to making sense of the way in which members of a minority group express and 
conduct themselves, they tend to be much less aware of the depth of their misunderstandings, 
if indeed they even get so far as acknowledging their very existence.  
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4 Culture and Communication 
4.1 Beyond language and interpretation: reaching across cultures  
If the presence of interpreters is therefore best regarded an aid – rather th n a solution – to the 
problem of facilitating inter-ethnic communication, what additional measures can the courts 
reasonably be expected to take in dealing with issues of this kind? Once we take aboard the 
fact that Britain is a plural society, and that a failure to acknowledge its existence is a 
potential source of inequity and injustice, on conclusion seems quite clear. Where issues of 
this kind arise, counsel need to be given adequate space within which to explore, and 
witnesses should be given a parallel opportunity to express, any distinctive cultural ideas and 
practices which might be relevant to the proceedings in hand.  
 
As is in so many other situations this does not require judges, magistrates or tribunal 
chairman to have any specific xpertise in the field, but rather that they should have a broad 
awareness of the reasons why problems of inter-ethnic communication may occur and the 
unacceptable consequences of ignoring them, together with a positive commitment to  
addressing them as and when they arise in court. Two main conclusions follow from this. 
First a simple point of etiquette: since no-o e is likely to be able to give a good account of 
themselves, or to feel that they their point of view is being listened to, unless they feel at 
ease, active steps should be taken to ensure that this is indeed the case. If in a doubt – even 
about such a simple matter as the correct pronunciation of a witnesses’ name – h re i  a very 
simple remedy: ask! The second issue is more substantial. To the extent that issues of culture 
and communication can at the very least cause bottlenecks in due process, and at worst 
precipitate severely inequitable outcomes, members of the bench should make it plain to 
counsel that they are well aware that this is so, and that they are ready to accept arguments 
and evidence which are presented in such a way as to take such matters into account, 
provided it is relevant to the proceedings in hand.  
 
If judges and magistrates were to make it plain – simply as a matter of outine – that for 
reasons of equity no less than of good practice, potential issues arising from the presence of 
ethnic diversity could not be overlooked, not only would members of the minorities begin to 
have a greater degree of confidence in the judicial system than they do at present, but counsel 
would also be encouraged to explore such issues in much more explicit terms throughout the 
course of proceedings.  
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4.2 Culture, equity and ‘common sense’ 
It is also worth noting that as soon as questions of culture and ommunication are recognised 
as being a necessary component of the courtroom agenda, a parallel set of issues also arises 
with respect to judicial instructions to the jury. In particular the routine injunction that jurors 
should deploy their ‘common sense’ as they set about evaluating the credibility of the 
evidence set before them may need careful qualification. If understandings of the kind which 
one might describe as common sense were uniformly shared by all segments of British 
society – as would be the case in the absence of ethnic pluralism – such a bare injunction 
might well be entirely adequate. In contexts of ethnic pluralism, however, common sense 
becomes a much more slippery concept. In the first place where different sub-groups organise 
their lives around radically differing sets of conceptual premises, ‘common sense’ ceases to 
be a common phenomenon, but will vary as between different groups; secondly the ‘common 
sense’ understandings found within any one group is very likely to include deeply e trenched 
negative stereotypes about the lifestyles of many of the others. In either case the ‘common 
sense’ test could lead members of the jury to evaluate some aspects of the evidence according 
to wholly inappropriate yardsticks. 
 
Whilst ethnically mixed juries could, at least in principle, provide an antidote to these 
problems, it would clearly be unwise to suggest that this provides anything like a sufficient 
safeguard. Firstly juries in cases with minority defendants are very frequently not ethnically 
mixed, especially when cases from major conurbations (where sheer demography ensures that 
defendants are much more likely to be drawn from one or other of the minorities) are farmed 
out to less pressurised courts elsewhere, and whose locally-recruited juries are much less 
likely to be mixed, or indeed to have had any experience of ethnic pluralism at all. Moreover 
even when a jury is visibly mixed, it does not necessarily follow that those jurors will be 
familiar with the specific linguistic and cultural con ext in which the proceedings in hand are 
set. Moreover even if they do have such knowledge, their can be no guarantee – especi lly if 
the matter has not been explicitly addressed during the course of the proceedings themselves - 
that such contributions will not be dismissed as special pleading by the remainder of the jury.  
 
In these circumstances it seems wholly appropriate – and ind ed necessary – for the judge to 
provide the jury with an indication of just what kind of ‘common sense’ to employ during the 
course of their deliberations, and above all to warn them of the dangers of deploying their 
own taken for granted assumptions to evaluate the behaviour of those whose cultural 
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conventions are very far from being congruent with their own. In such circumstan es it is 
much more appropriate to think oneself into the shoes of the actors in the case, and to seek to 
apply their notions of  reasonableness and common sense, rather than unthinkingly applying 
one’s own.  
But if this is so in criminal cases involving juries, the same principles also need to be borne in 
mind in all forms of adjudication in which no jury is present, as in most civil cases, 
magistrates courts, and a wide variety of tribunals. 
4.3 Culture as a contextual, not a causal phenomenon  
Since the adoption of such an approach at first sight seem very challenging, if only because 
of its relative novelty, it is worth saying a little about what it does, and what it does not,  
entail. Most importantly of all, it offers no support whatever for the proposition that ‘my 
culture’ can be offered as a carte blanche excuse for any kind of aberrant behaviour, for the 
very good reason that culture no more determines the actual content of our behaviour than 
grammar determines what we can or cannot say.  
 
Culture, like language, is a vehicle for human activity. Just as every meaningful verbal 
utterance has, by definition, a specific grammatical foundation, so every act of behaviour is 
likewise grounded within a specific cultural contest.; and just as it is impossible o decipher 
the meaning of any utterance without reference to the linguistic code being used by the 
speaker, so the significance of any act of behaviour cannot be adequately adjudged without 
reference to the relevant cultural code. But whilst these codes set the context for all forms of 
speech and behaviour, and also provide the vehicle through which both are articulated, they 
cannot and do not determine the actual content of anyone’s actions. Hence, for example, it 
would be quite wrong to suggest that cul ure might have ‘caused’ an Indian or Pakistani 
husband to strangle his wife following his discovery that she was having an affair with 
another man; nevertheless it would be quite right to remind a jury that given the immense 
significance of honour and shame in South Asian cultural contexts, such a husband might 
well find such an experience far more deeply humiliating – all other things being equal – th n 
would a man of some other ethnic affiliation. Moreover in exploring issues of provocation, it 
is also worth emphasising that the depth of hurt caused by any given verbal insult can only be 
assessed subjectively, or in other words in terms of its impact on its target’s sense of dignity. 
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It is also worth remembering that culture is a contextual phenomenon in a furth r sense, such 
that those with the necessary cultural competence can switch between different cultural 
modes as and when appropriate. A linguistic comparison graphically illustrates the point: just 
as someone who is bi-lingual has the ability to express themselves in two different languages 
as and when appropriate, so someone who is bi- or multi-cultural will have the ability act and 
react appropriately in a range of differently structured social and cultural arenas. From this 
perspective the younger – and especially the British born and bred – members of many 
minority communities can best be described as skilled cultural navigators, with the ability to 
manoeuvre their way around and between a wide range of different arenas.  
With this in mind it follows that it is quite wrong to assume that just because someone is 
manifestly at ease with English ways at work for example, they will of necessity only feel at 
ease if they order all other aspects of their lives in a similar way. Quite the contrary: someone 
with a successful professional career may, for example, also act as a dutifully respectful 
daughter-in-law when in the company of her more traditionally minded parents-in-law. Nor is 
such personal cultural pluralism simply a matter of either/or between ‘English modernity’ and 
‘Asian tradition’: our young professional and her husband will almost certainly follow a third 
– and much more mixed – set of conventions between themselves, as well as in the company 
of friends and associates of similar backgrounds to themselves.  
4.4 Putting culture itself in context: stereotypes are not the answer  
Despite our constant emphasis on the crucial importance of ensuring that behaviour is always 
evaluated with an awareness of the cultural context within which it was generated in mind, all 
one’s efforts to do so are likely to be rendered entirely counterproductive if tries to deal with 
the issues by relying on simplistic short cuts such as using one falls into the trap of taking 
simplistic short cuts such as “All Muslims do x …” or “All young Black men are y …”. Such 
stereotypical generalisations are not only grossly inaccurate, but the perceptions they generate 
are invariably as unhelpful as they are misleading.  
 
Two ‘health warnings’ should therefore be constantly borne in mind. The first is to take great 
care to avoid falling into the trap of assuming that some apparently easily identifiable body of 
people will of necessity constitute a discrete and homogeneous ‘cultural group’. Hence, for 
example, whilst outsiders may assume that members of groups they identify as ‘Asians’, 
‘Afro-Caribbeans’ and ‘Chinese’ have so much in common that each one can reasonably be 
Culture And Communication 12
regarded as forming a cultural group, insiders may well be much more aware of the 
differences, as, for example, btween Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, or between Punjabis, 
Gujaratis and Bengalis, let alone as between the disjunctions of caste, sect, gender and 
generation which snake their way round and through all those more obvious disjunctions in 
ever more complex ways. 
 
Secondly even if one was well-informed enough to be able to take all these many dimensions 
of differentiation into account with reasonable accuracy, it would quite wrong to assume, for 
example, that all members of the Visa Halari Oshwal Jains (who trace their rigins to the 
Shaurastra region of Gujarat, and who have come together as a relatively prosperous, but 
nevertheless very tight-knit community in Britain) can all be expected to behave in an 
identical way. Even at this very detailed level of ethnic specificity there are differences 
between rich and poor, between old and young, between the more and the less educated, , let 
alone as between those families which did, and those which did not, spend some time in East 
Africa before moving to Britain. Last but not least all these more or less systematic within-
group differences are overlain by all sorts of individualdifferences. Hence any expectation 
that cultural awareness can be reduced to a series of rules of thumb constructed along the 
lines of ‘all x’s do y’ is invariably hopelessly misleading. To reiterate, culture is a vehicl  for 
the organisation of behaviour, not a determinant of action. Stereotypical accounts constructed 
around the latter assumption are just as misleading and often more damaging than plain 
straightforward ignorance. 
4.5 A summary 
If there are any general conclusions that can be drawn from all this, one of the most important 
is don’t jump to conclusions in any direction. Making sense of what is going on is, as ever, a 
matter of judgement, a d such judgement should be exercised with care. Nevertheless in 
making such judgements it is worth remembering that since virtually every dimension of 
human activity is linguistically and culturally conditioned, any given item of speech or 
behaviour, any transaction, and any set of events which a witness may be seeking to describe 
should be located within the logic of the cultural context within which that events in question 
took place. Any observer (and the entire judicial process is ultimately such an obs rver) who 
seeks to decode the significance those events in the absence of an awareness of – or without 
taking account of – the logic of the cultural context within which they were generated is 
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danger of misreading, and so to misinterpreting, what went on. Careful and well-informed 
context-setting is therefore an essential component of good – and above all equitable – 
professional practice.  
 
5 Appearances in Court  
Whilst law itself is essentially an abstract set of propositions and principles, proceedings in 
court – in which concrete events are examined in minute detail, albeit against the backdrop of 
those propositions and principles – lie right at the opposite end of the spectrum. Moreover the 
term hearing is an apt description of what goes on in court. Not only does the verbal 
presentation of evidence provide the court with an opportunity to weigh and assess its 
significance, but that very process also provides the court with a parallel opportunity to assess 
the personal credibility of every witness who appears before it. And given the pervasive 
impact of culture on human behaviour, the conventions which are used to establish – and 
likewise to assess – personal credibility are far from uniform.  
 
Since witnesses are well aware that the evidence they offer will be subject to scrutiny, and 
also that the way in which they present themselves is likely to have a far-reac ing impact on 
the extent to which what they have to say is adjudged to credible, most go to considerable 
lengths to brush up their appearance. Such efforts can, however, easily become badly unstuck 
if the code which the witness habitually deploys is at odds with those habitually used by the 
court.  
5.1 Eye-contact  
Consider, for example, the use of the eyes, for although eye-contact plays a crucial role in the 
process of communication in every cultural system, the rules governing its use vary. In most 
European cultural traditions, for example, a person’s willingness to sustain a direct gaze into 
his or her interlocutor’s eyes is routinely taken to be a positive indicator of honesty and 
sincerity; and by contrast an unwillingness to do so is equally routinely read as an indication 
of shiftiness and unease, and very possibly of guilt. However other cultural traditions 
organise matters quite differently. In South Asian contexts, for example, any woman who 
makes direct eye contact with an unrelated man is regarded as brazen, and in all probability 
signalling her sexual availability. Hence modest and respectable women expect, and are 
expected, to shield themselves from the direct gaze of men, and most especially from senior 
male relatives. From this perspective for a woman to present herself for public examination in 
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open court will be a daunting experience at the best of times. She may well therefore keep h r
eyes lowered partly as a defensive measure, but also because of a deeply ingrained feeling 
that the best way to establish her personal social worth as well as the credibility of her 
evidence is by demonstrably sustaining a proper sense of public modesty. 
 
In a similar vein most Chinese traditions are acutely concerned about the prospect of a 
possible ‘loss of face’, which have in turn led to the development of elaborate forms of 
politeness, particularly in public contexts. So its that highly elliptical forms of expression 
perfectly normal in Chinese contexts can easily be read as bafflingly unhelpful, and hence as 
inherently suspicious by Euro-American interlocutors. By contrast Chinese observers take the 
view that the ‘honest and straightforward’ approach so favoured in the West is crude and 
uncivilised, especially since blundering about in this way can all too easily lead to a quite 
unnecessary loss of face.  
 
Both African and Caribbean traditions utilise conventions which differ yet again, with 
consequences which can be equally unfortunate. Thus whilst Europeans favour a 
straightforward ‘look me in the eye’ approach, in many African and Afro-C ribbean c ntexts 
for a young person to look an authority figure in the eye is not taken to indicate impudence, 
insult and hence disrespect. When codes of behaviour differ so comprehensively, the 
potential for confusion is enormous: not only are signals likely to be misread, but there can be 
nothing more disturbing than to be told ‘Act appropriately!’ when one is in one’s own
opinion already doing just that.  
 
Whilst much more could be said about rules of eye-contact, as well as the wider theme of 
differing conventions of body-language, the basic issue should by now be obvious enough. If 
English conventions are uncritically deployed in assessing the demeanour of witnesses, there 
is a very real danger of drawing wholly erroneous conclusions about the personal credibility 
of those from minority backgrounds before they even said anything at all. 
5.2 Conformity and Resistance 
This whole situation is rendered even more complex when – as is most usually the case – 
members of the minorities are aware of the dangers that their behaviour may be misread in 
this way, and where they take steps to counter that possibility. In doing so a number of 
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strategies may be adopted, although each one brings an attendant set of dangers and 
contradictions. 
 
The most straightforward response is, of course, one of conformity: of presenting oneself as if 
one’s normal modes of self-expression were id ntical with those of the native English. But 
although this is the strategy which most English observers would prefer all members of the 
minorities to adopt, it is only likely to be really successful if deployed by someone who is 
fully conversant and withEnglish ways. If, however, the witnesses’ skills in cross-cultural 
navigation are not up to the task in hand, their valiant efforts to present themselves in a 
manner which they hope and believe an English audience will find more acceptable can 
easily turn out to be wholly counter-productive. If witnesses are less culturally competent 
than they imagine, their efforts to re-package themselves may well be so crude and stilted as 
to be entirely unconvincing, so much so that all their evidence is dismissed either as 
irrelevant or as patent fakery.  
 
Nor does the process end there. If we accept Sir William Macpherson’s definition of 
institutional racism, and consider the impact of the kind of collective failure to which he 
points might have on members of the minorities themselves, it is clearly idle to assume that 
their own ideas and expectations will have been unaffected by regular exposure to “processes, 
attitudes and behaviour which amounts to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, 
ignorance, thoughtlessnes  and racist stereotyping”. On the contrary to the extent that 
members of the minorities are habituated to the experience of not being taken seriously – and 
of being mistreated in just those ways highlighted in this volume – in all their encounters with 
the education, health and social welfare systems, it follows that they may well regard the 
police service and the courts with a considerable amount of suspicion, even if they have 
previously had no personal contact with the criminal justice system.  
 
These experiences can leading, at the extreme, to two very different kinds of response: either 
to bow one’s head in the hope that by causing as little further difficulty as possible one might 
pick up some small crumbs of mercy, or – at the other end of the spectrum – to expect the 
worst, and on those grounds to make little or no effort to conform to the court’s expectations, 
choosing instead to sustain one’s dignity and pride by going down with all guns blazing. 
Responses which tend towards this end of the spectrum, and which can frequently be 
observed amongst young people of Afro-Caribbean descent, are, on the face of it, wholly 
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counterproductive. Defendants who behave in this way tend to be treated with little 
sympathy, and to attract exceptionally stiff sentences.  However strategies of this kind begin 
to make better sense once one begins to appreciate that they are almost invariably adopted by 
members of groups which are already socially marginalised – or, s in the Afro-Caribbean 
case, have an exceptionally long history of social marginalisation – and who have responded 
to that experience by generating an outlook which values personal dignity so highly that they 
are prepared even to sacrifice their liberty in order to sustain it. From this perspective ‘taking 
the pressure’ – and so reinforcing one’s sense of personal self-worth – can be seen as 
constituting a far more honourable response to institutional racism than is any strategy which 
ultimately requires one to bow to its unjust, and necessarily demeaning, demands.  
 
There can be little doubt that a wide variety of authority figures, from teachers and probation 
officers to policemen and prison officers, find such tactics extremely hard to cope with, 
especially if – as invariably the case – they have had no advice or training as to what a 
professionally appropriate response might be. What is quite clear, however, is that if white 
professionals take the easy way out by seeking to impose their expectations come what may, 
their very behaviour will appear further to confirm many young black peoples’ most 
pessimistic assumption: that teachers, policemen, prison officers and so forth can be relied 
upon to act so aggressively towards them that dignified but dismissive resistance constitutes 
their only legitimate response. Such cycles of mutual irritation go a long way towards 
explaining the exceptionally high frequencies with which young Afro-Caribbean males are 
excluded from school, stopped and searched, appear before the courts, receive custodial 
sentences, and are identifi d as ‘problems’ in prison management. 
 
All this poses a substantial challenge for the criminal justice system, and especially for the 
courts themselves. Not only do numerous cases which are grounded, at least in part, within 
such unhelpful cycles of polarisation come before the courts, but many Afro-Caribbean 
defendants have grown so sceptical about ll majority institutions that they deploy their 
strategies of resistance as a matter of course. That judges and magistrates should find such 
behaviour extremely irritating is wholly understandable, since tactics of this kind implicitly 
treat the very impartiality of the court with contempt. But before utilising one’s authority to 
slap down those who have the temerity to behave in this way, it is worth remembering firstly 
that these irritating tactics may well have been generated in the context of a whole series of 
similar encounters, and secondly that all those who respond such challenges with naked force 
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thereby undermine any claims which they might have had o legitimate authority, at least as 
far as that section of the community is concerned.  
 
In circumstances such as this the proper exercise of justice is manifestly rendered extremely 
difficult, and as Sir William Macpherson would doubtless confirm, there are no easy answers. 
Moreover whilst it is wholly reasonable to demand that the courts should not exacerbate these 
problems, it would be idle to suggest that the justice system acting alone can hope to resolve 
them. Only when the system of public administration in general begins to develop more 
specific guidelines about how the concurrent growth of racial inequality and ethnic pluralism 
can best be coped with will the criminal justice system be in a position to develop 
comprehensive solutions to these problems.  
 
That said, some more specific guidelines which should enable the courts to avoid the worst of 
these problems can still be discerned. Firstly to ensure that no-one is put at a disadvantage 
simply because his or her normal modes of linguistic, cultural and behavioural expression 
differ from those routinely deployed by the native English. Secondly care should be taken to 
reassure minority defendants that the court will not overlook or dismiss their own 
perspectives and concerns, regardless of how may ave been treated – or in which they 
perceive themselves as having been treated – by other agencies. If routinely implemented 
such measures would not only significantly enhance the quality of cross-cultural 
communication, but also an invaluable counter to the prospect of minority defendants – and 
indeed minority litigants of all kinds – fi ing themselves being inequitably treated.  
5.3 Telling stories 
Although improving the quality of communication in legal proceedings will clearly be 
welcome to all concerned, it is nevertheless worth emphasising that the comprehensive 
implementation of such guidelines would throw up some very substantial challenges to 
established practices and procedures. The reasons are simple enough. In so far as established 
practices and procedures are embedded within taken-for-gra ted English cultural 
conventions, as they invariably are, those very conventions and expectations will, at least in 
some circumstances, be at odds with the conventions in terms of which members of the 
minorities habitually operate. Hence considerable confusion – and hence miscommunication 
– can very easily occur if minority witnesses continue utilise their own familiar modes of 
information presentation when these are at odds with those habitually used in court. Whilst 
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such problems may occur with respect all minority groups, the example presented here is set 
in a South Asian rather than an Afro-Caribbean context.  
 
English lawyers, and indeed English law as currently constituted, generally take it for granted 
that unless every component of the evidence which a witness offers – be that in court or in 
earlier statements which he or she has given to the police – adds up to a coherent story, the 
credibility of the whole edifice is necessarily cast into doubt. Witnesses know that too, so 
even if they have confected all their evidence, they will invariably seek to weld their story 
together so that it forms a coherent whole. It follows that a central feature of cross-
examination is the subjection of the evidence presented by ach witness to the closest 
possible scrutiny; and since coherence and consistency are taken to be the touchstones of 
credibility, any cracks and contradictions in a witness’ story invariably elicits the challenge 
“You’re a liar!” from counsel. Moreover it is also assumed that if a witness can be shown to 
have lied with respect to any one component of his or her evidence, that its other components 
can be dismissed as unreliable. 
 
Yet however familiar, and hence straightforward, this procedure and its underlying premises 
may seem, such conventions are far from being universally applied as the foundation for 
forensic examination and debate. In rural South Asia – as in many other peasant societies – 
the provision of accurate information to outsiders, and especially to outsiders who may be 
agents of the state, is regarded as most unwise, even if one has nothing in particular to hide. 
So long as one has no idea about what such outsiders are up to, nor of the use to which they 
might put such information, it is best – or so most peasants conclude – to dissimulate on 
principle. If there is a real prospect that accurate information about one’s family’s doings, and 
especially about its wealth, might be used to its disadvantage to outsiders, promoting the 
circulation of fictions makes good sense, since it likely to put one’s enemies, whoever they 
may be and whatever their motives, off the scent. 
 
Matters become more complex amongst insiders, and especially as between kinsmen and 
fellow villagers. They cannot be so easily fobbed off because they know too much already. 
Nevertheless it is striking that when disputes break out within extended kinship networks (as 
they frequently do), and when efforts are made to resolve the dispute in a panchayat or 
village council (as is equally routine), the rules of debate are quite different from those 
deployed in an English context. Whilst factual evidence is not entirely overlooked, a central 
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priority of each and every party to the dispute is to demonstrate that they occupy a position of 
moral superiority, in sharp contrast to their opponents scurrilous behaviour. Nor are 
arguments necessarily restricted to the immediate dispute in hand. Besides raking over a long 
past history of disputes, which may go back over several generations, it is also entirely in 
order to seek to demonstrate that one’s opponents have behaved in a morally inadequate way 
in some entirely different context. Since success in each of these many sub-arguments adds 
force to one’s elbow, the debate around the central dispute is not only conducted on a point-
scoring basis, but everyone readily shifts their position the better to counter whatever set of 
arguments their opponents may develop. So it is that all participants seek to demonstrate the 
inherent justice of their cla ms, and although a just settlement is precisely what the elders 
who make up the panchayat seek to achieve, no-o e is greatly concerned with the fact that if 
taken as a whole, most people’s stories lack coherence and consistency. How could that be, 
they might ask, given that everyone always seeks to present themselves in the best possible 
light? Indeed are not the English rather odd to regard anyone who constantly shifts their 
ground as lying, given that this is a wholly expected dimension of human behaviour? Th  
elders – precisely because they ar  elders – are in no way alarmed, disturbed or misled by 
such tactics. Instead they are expected to see through all this, and to use their wisdom and 
experience to propose a just compromise.  
 
An English courtroom is not, of course, a panchayat. Nevertheless to the extent that many 
members of Britain’s South Asian population still routinely deploy just such conventions of 
debate, discussion and dispute resolution within the context of their own communities, it is 
hardly surprising that when and if they find themselves in court they continue to present 
themselves and their arguments in a familiar (and to them wholly reasonable) way. In view of 
this it is hardly surprising that South Asian witnesses – a d especially those drawn from 
communities whose lifestyles are still close to their rural roots – very often do behave in ways 
which English observers find at best bizarre and at worst thoroughly unhelpful. Hence, for 
example, they may put a great deal of effort into demonstrating how morally upright they are, 
even when this has no apparent relevance to the matter in hand, and when they can be 
persuaded to address those issues, often turn out to be highly resistant to providing straight 
answers to a straight questions, and seem quite incapable of telling a coherent story.  
 
To those not versed in such modes of argument and self-presentation, and especially to those 
who assume that the anglo-saxon tradition of empiricism provides the only viable foundation 
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for argument and debate, such flights of fancy may seem to point only in one direction: that 
rural South Asian is filled with congenital liars. But however tempted judges and magistrates 
– let alone solicitors and barristers – may be to concur with such a conclusion, it is worth
remembering that access to the code which underpins such behaviour would not only render 
it much less bewildering, but would put one in a much better position to make a judgement 
about the total scenario to which all the witnesses had contributed, just as the elders in the 
panchayat seek to do. To ask members of the English judiciary to make equitable decisions in 
a situation such as this is, of course, to present them with a very substantial challenge. But if 
reacting positively to pluralism is the task in hand, developing the capacity to respond to 
situations such as this with a reasonable degree equity is precisely what is now required.  
5.4 Playing to the audience: exploiting stereotypes to one’s own advantage 
There are, however, several levels to this agenda. Whilst dealing with situations in which 
both parties presents their arguments in the ways outlined in the previous section is 
challenging enough, reaching equitable decisions in situations where one only party does so 
more or less systematically, but where witnesses for the other side are sufficiently well-
informed about English expectations to be able to present themselves in much more familiar 
terms poses yet greater difficulties still. Faced with a situation where set of witnesses follow 
their own relatively mysterious conventions, whilst the other present themselves in ways 
which the court finds much more familiar, there will almost inevitably be a strong temptation 
to favour that latter as against the former, regardless of what the real merits of their case may 
be. Whilst many examples of such a situation could be cited, one of the most classic is one in 
which serious conflict has developed between more or less conventionally minded South 
Asian parents and one or more of their British born and bred tee age daughters.  
 
The underlying conflicts in such situations may well be real enough. Inter-generatio al 
tensions between concerned (and possibly over-concerned) parents on the one hand, and their 
rebellious (and possibly over-reb llious) autonomy-seeking offspring on the other are of 
course a commonplace feature of all societies. Nevertheless where conflicts grounded in such 
tensions come to the attention of English courts, and where the parents – in sharp contrast to 
their daughter – are largely unfamiliar with English ways, they may well find themselves 
quite unable to present their alarms and concerns in a way which will be meaningful to the 
court, whilst the daughter may well find she has an opportunity to have a field day at her 
parents’ expense. Since the daughter will almost certainly have an excellent appreciation of 
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the impact which buzz words such as ‘arranged marriage’, ‘traditionalist’, ‘fundamentalist’ 
and so forth are likely to have on ill-informed English observers, painting her parents as 
mindless authoritarians, who are seeking to limit her freedom for reasons which are as 
arbitrary as they are unjust is a comparatively easy task.  
 
That does not, of course, exclude the possibility that her parents are indeed acting in precisely 
that way. Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that it is equally possible, and probably 
more likely, that a headstrong and careless young woman is taking advantage of the deep 
divide between her parents assumptions and those of the wider English world to avoid all her 
parents’ efforts to impose a degree constraint on her unbridled hedonism. If so, it follows that 
she may well be far less unfamiliar with – or uncomfortable about – the moral conventions 
within which her parents operate than her carefully arrnged self-p esentation seems to 
suggest, and that her parents concern for her future may well have far less arbitrary 
foundations than was apparent at first sight.  
 
Disinterring just what is going on in such circumstances, especially when  they have led to all 
manner of additional altercations, is never an easy task, so much so that social workers, 
lawyers and judges who are not fully alive the many underlying cultural issues can easily find 
themselves seduced by what may well be little more than a bare-faced effort to pander to 
English sensibilities. Faced with a young woman who effortlessly presents herself as the put-
upon victim of mindless power, unjustly oppressed in her efforts to exercise sweet freedom, it 
is easy to forget even to consider whether there might be another side to the story. In such 
circumstances worried parents can easily find their wholly realistic concerns about their 
daughter’s welfare given exceedingly short shrift, much to their surprise, alarm and 
bewilderment.  
 
No easy guidelines can be offered with respect to issues of this kind, other than to remind 
oneself that to uncritically prioritise arguments which are set within a conceptual framework 
with which one is already familiar,  and in so doing to discard and devalue those which ar
grounded in some other less familiar conceptual universe cannot be regarded as an adequate 
foundation for either equity or justice. Or to put it the other way round, a failure to do so will 
inevitably institutionalise inequity and injustice.  
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6 Conclusion: facing up to relativity 
6.1 Whose culture? 
Yet although equity demands that legal decision-making should be broadly neutral in cultural 
terms, for to do otherwise would inevitably privilege those who deployed one set of cultural 
conventions, whilst correspondingly disprivileging all those minority groups who chose to 
use some other set of cultural conventions to organise their lives, putting that ideal into 
operation is, of necessity, an exceedingly challenging task. The most central reason why this 
is so will by now be obvious enough. In a world which either is, or is at least assumed to be 
culturally homogeneous, the taken for granted premises which underpin that tradition can be 
used as yardsticks of normality – or in the language of the Common Law, asreasonable 
behaviour. However the moment one acknowledges firstly that ours is de facto a plural 
society, and secondly that a failure to acknowledge the existence of plurality will, of 
necessity, open the door to the institutionalised inequality, a whole series of ideas which had 
hitherto not been subjected to much analytical scrutiny – and most especially the concept of 
reasonable behaviour – is instantly rendered highly problematic. What is reasonable? Whose 
view of reasonableness is the most reasonable? Or to put it more precisely, once yardsticks 
become relative, just what are the appropriate yardsticks in any given context, and how, by 
whom and on what basis should the be located? Moreover this question also needs to be 
addressed at two levels: firstly within the context of any given minority community, and 
secondly as between the minorities and the majority. 
6.2 Cultural variety within the minorities 
Although verbal shorthand often leads us to use a form of words which appears to suggest 
that members of a large social category – such as ‘the Chinese’, ‘the Asians’, ‘the Afro-
Caribbeans’ and so forth – all tend to act in a similar way, such large-scale grouping 
invariably exhibit a very substantial degree of internal cultural diversity. Hence, for example, 
Hakka cultural conventions differ in certain important respects from those deployed by Han 
Chinese, even if both have Cantonese roots; likewise Punjabis differ from Gujaratis, Yoruba 
from Ibo and so on and so forth. 
 
However even if accept the existence of these variations, of which only those intimately 
familiar with the communities in question are likely to be aware, none of these have been left 
untouched by their user’s passage to Britain. Hence despite the apparent conservatism of 
most members of the first generation of settlers, it is worth remembering that the process of 
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settlement and ethnic reconstruction has in fact been an active process of adaptation, such 
that the lifestyles which have emerged in Britain are from being carbon copies of those back 
home. Hence even the most conservative families turn out, on close inspection, to have made 
the most of – and hence had their lives transformed by – all the many material opportunities 
available in their new environment. But although many settlers soon become avid us rs of all 
manner of consumer gadgetry, and in that sense highly westernised, it certainly does not 
follow that moral values in terms of which they organise their lives will always have been 
similarly transformed. Quite the contrary. Although attitudes vary a good deal within, and 
even more so as between specific communities, most settlers are not only strongly committed 
to sustaining the values they hold most dear, but to the extent that their image of how one 
ought to behave is often set in rose-tinted vision of the past, they not are infrequently more 
conservative in their outlook than their non-migrant peers. Hence if one seeks to establish 
yardsticks of normality in such contexts, it is essential to base them in an appreciation of the 
logic of the customs and conventions which underpin current patterns of social relations 
within local settlements in Britain. It goes without saying that these conventions often differ 
quite substantially from those deployed within migrants’ villages of origin, let alone from 
those laid down in formal compilations such as the Hindu d armashastras nd the Islamic 
shari’ah. 
 
Nor is that all. However much the older generation may idealise the way things were back 
home, the details of that vision is endlessly contested as b tween women and men, between 
the more and the less religiously committed, let alone as between those who insist on strict 
behavioural orthodoxy and whose understanding of religion as a spiritual experience leads 
them to adopt a much more relaxed outlook. Over and above all this the younger generation 
have also begun to throw their hats into the arena, but in equally diverse ways. As is only to 
be expected they frequently their parents’ understandings, but in no less diverse ways. Some 
(although many fewer than outsiders tend to assume) argue for the comprehensive adoption 
of English ways, others argue that established practices (of arranged marriage, for example) 
should be subjected to a greater or lesser degree of modification, whilst others yet again are 
seeking to create (or as they see it to revive) the ideal behavioural order which underpinned – 
or so their personal explorations suggest – the ideal world of the Islamic u ma, the Sikh 
khalsa, or indeed of Rastafari.  
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Given the complexity of these processes, let alone the capacity of most members of the 
younger generation to navigate their way through a wide range of differently structured 
arenas, constantly re-ord ring their behaviour as they go along, any attempt to label 
individuals as intrinsically ‘westernised’, ‘traditional’, ‘religious’ and so forth is profoundly 
misleading. Hence rather than seeking to slot individuals into fixed categories of this kind, it 
is invariably far more illuminating to make an assessment of the way in which they are likely 
to have configured their behaviour in a given context.  
6.3 The organisation of justice in plural Britain 
This Chapter began by highlighting the vital importance of verbal communication to the 
processes of adjudication, so much so that communication failures arising from cross-cultural 
misunderstanding could strike deeply at the effectiveness of the delivery of justice in courts 
and tribunals of all kinds. However it should now be quite clear that these problems – and 
their associated conundrums – arise at many levels in the context of our increasingly multi-
lingual and poly-ethnic society. But although we began by considering the way in which 
properly equipped and supported interpreters can greatly assist the court in overcoming the 
most overt obstacles to mutual understanding, closer inspection soon revealed that accurately 
translating what has been said in one language into a form of words which is equally 
meaningful to speakers of another is a far more challenging task than is commonly 
appreciated.  
 
If a language was merely a collection of words, interpreting from one language to another 
would involve little more than a mechanical process of substitution, such that words and 
phrases drawn from the lexicon of one language are replaced by those drawn from another. 
But as anyone who has tried to do so themselves will know, the process is in fact far more 
complex than this. Besides having its own lexicon, every language is grounded within its own 
conceptual system, which is in turn a vital component of the much wider cultural context 
which its speakers have constructed around themselves. In the absence of an understanding of 
the wider conceptual framework within which someone is operating, it is almost impossible 
accurately to describe – or to provide others with a means of comprehending – the 
significance of what that person has done or said.  
 
To the extent that that is so, the ever-growing salience of linguistic and ethnic plurality in 
contemporary Britain presents all those involved in adjudication with ch lle ges which run 
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far beyond the technical problem of translation: at least in principle all the system’s well 
established measuring tools – and so the very yardsticks of justice themselves – are th reby 
called into question. This is not to argue for out and out relativity, or to insist that because 
any conceptual system is as good as any other, everything must thereby be allowed to take its 
course. That is a recipe for chaos. We all live in a single society, and no matter how plural its 
various elements may be, the legal system plays a vital role in holding all those elements 
together.  
 
However fulfilling this task effectively is by definition a balancing act. Whilst order is most 
easily articulated in situations of comprehensive homogeneity, to act as if such homogeneity 
was the reality in the context of a society which is de facto plural will, of necessity, lead to 
inequitable outcomes, for those who differ will instantly find themselves at a disadvantage. 
Just how the courts can best set about negotiating their way between these two conflicting 
principles is still an open question, and many years are likely to pass before such questions 
are fully resolved. One point is quite unquestionable, however: these are issues which we 
cannot afford to ignore.  
 
  
 
